Fundamental Reasons for BJP Defeat
The Bharatiya Janata Party, the vehicle of pure nationalism in Indian politics, has suffered a
second successive defeat in national general elections. It is understandable that a lot of effort
will be spent on localized micro-analysis, as well as on extracting generalized views like
imperfect confidence levels, negativity in campaign, national-mood-an-aggregate-of-local-ones
(this last one is just not true as there was a definite nationwide undercurrent), etc. However, to
see if our explanations of the apparent causes are really fitting the effects, one has to first
appreciate the magnitude of the effect itself.
Let us look at the analogy of two beams each fixed at one of their ends to a solid wall, and at
the other end supporting equal loads. One of the beams is made of solid steel, and the other an
awkward construct of wooden pieces patched together with pudding. The former is like the
BJP, the latter like the Congress - with SRP as the pudding. Now which would one expect to
collapse first when heavily loaded (with the same weights) – the solid steel beam or the wooden
patched one? Obviously the latter. The wonder is that the solid steel beam has collapsed, while
the wooden patchwork has held.
Trying to explain the causes of defeat in terms of local organizational weaknesses is like trying
to explain the above analogy in terms of hairline cracks in the solid steel beam. And trying to
explain the causes in terms of incorrect confidence, negativity, agglomerated effects, etc, is as
superficial as trying to explain the above analogy in terms of colour of the steel beam or its
surface roughness. It is obvious that the reasons lie in things more fundamental – those that
have not yet arisen properly within the boundaries of our thinking processes.
Fact is, the comparative environment in favour of the BJP was even more drastic than the
analogical comparison between the two beams would suggest. Just look at these aspects:
- no ruling party at the centre since 1989 has ever returned to power under conditions of
greater than 8% inflation in prices of primary food articles. In the five years of UPA
rule, these prices have increased more than 60%; the latter half of this period accounting
for the bulk of this increase
- a terrorist attack of the magnitude of 26/11 has not occurred in India before. This was
preceded by equally jarring terrorist attacks across all major Indian cities – with the
exception of cities along the eastern coast. And it was the activism of the BJP ruled
Gujarat government post-Ahmedabad-attack that put an end to this chain of bombings
- the chain of scams like Satyam, Quatrocchi, CBI-misuse and parliamentary bribery
scandal were unprecedented in any prior 5-year governance period, including those of
Congress rule
- the depression, job-losses and economic uncertainty in the past nine months were again
unseen before in India
- the Congress chief campaigners shamelessly ran away from one-to-one debates in
public, and its president didn’t even have the guts to give a single press interview – lest
the internal hollowness get exposed
- and most importantly, the comparison between the years of NDA and UPA rule. The
BJP faced the wrath of the world order by making India an overt nuclear power. It faced
and rolled back the global economic sanctions (accompanied simultaneously by years of
poor monsoon) to transform India into an economic powerhouse – with years of
unprecedented low inflation creating low interest rates that spurred capital investment,
leading – with a time lag – to greater than 8.5% growth rates that continued into the first
three years of UPA rule. In the process every Indian across the world could hold his
head high. And what did the UPA do? Transformed this atmosphere of positivity into
depression. The Indians across the world who could strut around proudly – “our time
has come” – were now transformed into shamed “slumdogs”. Any Indian with minor
self-esteem (and that leaves out only spies and criminals) would find it extremely
painful to sit through that movie. Its decoration with multiple Oscars is only a sequel to
the Western attempt to humiliate emerging powers like India and China. And yet the
Congress claimed credit for that movie and co-opted its theme song into its campaign.
And wonder of wonders, with this sort of background the Congress won the elections
hands down while the BJP reached its nadir!
Obviously there is something profound, deep down that is causing this. To find this out, let
us return to our analogy and ask the question – were the two loads supported by the two
beams really the same, as we had assumed?
Superficially, the BJP was fighting the Congress and the Congress the BJP, so the loads
supported by both beams were apparently the same (here load = what is being fought
against). But in reality, the BJP was fighting the Congress plus – and here we introduce a
new term – the “Public Opinion Makers”, while the Congress was fighting the BJP minus
the Public Opinion Makers (or POM). And the load supported by the steel beam was far, far
higher than the wooden one, leading to its collapse. This is the fundamental reason for the
BJP defeat, not just in 2009 but in 2004 as well.
Now who are the “Public Opinion Makers”? As the name suggests, they are the ones who
determine what the country thinks, how it responds to emergent situations, and how it
evolves in thought. In other words, they determine the direction of the National Mind. They
operate at both pan-national and regional levels. Broadly, they can be classified into three
groups: TV News Channels (we will club Radio with this), Newspapers (including
newsmagazines), and what we may call as “distributed opinion makers”. The first two do
not need any explanation. The “distributed opinion makers” are the traditional, localized,
grassroots-level opinion makers. This includes samskaras and socio-cultural values & traits,
public-place gossip, views of reputed personalities, and also mass movements. As an aside,
the following clarifications are in order:
1. “Character maker” and “Opinion maker” are two different things, in so far as character
is different from opinion. While opinion is transitory, character is more fundamental
and permanent. If “character maker” and “opinion maker” are defined as two different
sets, the region of overlap between them lies in the “distributed opinion maker” space.
TV news and newspapers have hardly any role in making character, while primary &
secondary educational institutions, which have no role in making opinion, have a
significant role in making character.
2. The internet and blogspace cannot be considered to have any worthwhile role in making
public opinion in our country, and the situation will not change at least in the next ten
years. This space is restricted (in terms of time spent) to those who do not have any
serious family or professional responsibilities, who are usually males, who are unlikely
to turn out and vote, and most importantly, to those who are social loners – the latter
trait increasing in intensity with time spent on the net. The BJP erred severely in trying
to make the internet its prime means of advertisement and public reach in election 2009
pushing newspaper & TV ads to a secondary role, and it needs to seriously introspect
why (i.e. what led it to) it did so, instead of just saying retrospectively that it was
incorrect.
Continuing with the Public Opinion Makers or POM, the first important point of note is that
its composition has been changing significantly with time. When there was no TV and
hardly any newspapers, the bulk of POM was composed of the “distributed opinion
makers”. That is no longer true today, and this shift has been very rapid over the past
twenty years. Figure 1 below shows the evolution in the composition of POM space over
the past twenty years, from 1990 to 2009. Please note this is an approximate, qualitative
view, not based on analysis of accumulated data. It shows the trends, not the actuals, and
serves as an enabler in framing our concepts. Furthermore, these trends are averaged across
the country, and across urban & rural areas.
In 1990, when Sri Ram Janambhoomi agitation was at its peak, TV-news occupied only
10% of POM space, while the “distributed opinion makers” occupied about 40%. The share
of TV-news increased sharply in the period 2000-2005 (during the NDA government),
when a multiplicity of regional news channels came into existence across the country. Share
of newspapers did not decrease correspondingly due to the spread of literacy. Consequently,
the share of “distributed opinion makers” decreased the most (see Fig. 1).
Fig.1. Evolving composition of "Public Opinion Maker" (POM) space - qualitative
view. At any year, the balance is made of "distributed opinion makers".
0
20
40
60
80
100
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Percent of POM space
TV News
Newspapers
Sum of Two
Now why would this compositional change in POM space affect the BJP? Because that
component which is the most antagonistic to the RSS school of thought has increased
sharply, while that which was least unfriendly has contracted the most. First the evidences:
- the media manipulation to describe Shri Narendra Modi as a mass murderer while
simultaneously painting Shri Rajiv Gandhi as a secular hero has only one parallel in
recent human history – the painting of Saddam Hussein as a beast by the Western media
followed by the American invasion and capture of Iraq. The most vicious communal
violence that occurred in post-independence India was in Delhi in 1984, when nearly
3000 Sikhs were slaughtered by Congress goons in purely one-sided violence.
Ironically, that was the only occasion when an attempt was made to justify the killings,
by Rajiv Gandhi who said that the ground shakes when a big tree falls. Yet RG remains
a secular hero. There have been about half-a-dozen riots of the scale of Gujarat-2002,
with deaths of different communities in similar proportions. Bhagalpur in 1989,
Mumbai in 1993, earlier in Meerut-Malliana and Ahmedabad itself. They all occurred
under Congress rule, and no one so much as remembers the names of the then Congress
Chief Ministers. Yet Shri Modi, who never even hinted at any justification, was marked
out as a “murderer”
- immediately after 26/11, public passion against the Congress governments at the state
and centre was running high. That anger was natural and rightful in a democracy –
which punishes governments for their failures and forces extant governments to correct
themselves. Yet a slew of TV news channels very cleverly converted the anger into a
hatred for “all politicians” – as if the opposition BJP was as accountable for 26/11 as the
ruling Congress!! And the public innocently fell for it
- one may note how, in the middle of the election campaign, the news of the suicide of
Priyanka’s father-in-law was meticulously blacked out. This does not happen in any
healthy functional democracy, where the private lives of prominent individuals are
always under the scanner. When lady Priyanka made it to the news, it was with her
“brilliant” statement – “mai apni daadi ki saree may kaisi lagti hoon?” – headlineflashed
carefully across all UP newspapers just on the eve of the third phase of polls.
And the Congress won the bulk of its seats from this phase. What synchronization!
- how the “pub-attack” issue in Mangalore was highlighted beyond any rationality. The
attackers were not BJP/RSS men and they were behaving likewise even under non-BJP
state governments; no woman was even touched by the attackers and it was only their
male companions who were beaten; and surprisingly, the same day as the pub-attack,
three doctors on a morning walk on a Bangalore pavement were overrun and killed on
the spot by a car driven by a youth who had been drinking all through the previous night
– yet this incident did not even find mention in the TV channels!
- during the high growth rate period in the later phase of NDA rule, the media repeatedly
made the point that this is a consequence of the “liberalization” policies started by Dr.
Manmohan Singh as finance minister. When “Chandrayaan” reached the moon, the
media blanked out the fact that the entire mission was conceived, funded and even
named by the Vajpayee-led NDA government, the only contribution of the Congress
government was that it did not kill the project
- how the nationwide bandh called by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad during the Amarnath
land agitation was mocked by the TV news channels – most of the Hindi channels
simply carried a running commentary on how a man who was taking his father, who had
had a heart-attack, to a hospital somewhere in Haryana, was blocked by the bandh and
the inhumanity of the bandh supporters
- one can go one and on with examples, but by this time it is pretty evident that the two
components of the POM space – TV news and newsprint – had been playing a blatantly
anti-BJP game. And in 2009 they made up 80% of POM space.
Having seen the evidences, we now move on to the facts and then the causes. Figure 2 shows
the evolution of the share of pro-BJP-ideology elements in each of the three components of the
POM, and hence the net share of pro-BJP-ideology elements in total POM space, over the past
twenty years. Again, these represent a qualitative analysis and not based on hard data; the
background information is of just that level of accuracy that would enable us to derive our
concepts. Since it is not possible to objectively identify “pro-BJP-elements” within the
“distributed opinion makers”, its share in this component is taken at a constant level of onethird
(33%).
Fig.2. Evolving share of pro-BJP elements in components of POM space - qualitative
view. Among "distributed opinion makers", this share is constant at 33%.
0
20
40
60
80
100
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Percent of pro-BJP-ideology elements in each
component of, and in the total, POM space
in TV News
in Newspapers
in Total POM
Three interesting points may be noticed in fig. 2. First, the steep increase seen in pro-BJP share
between 1996 and 2001, mostly in the TV news component but also in newspapers. The
reasons are, first, reduction in government control and interference (note this was also the
period when Congress influence was waning), second, the favorable environment created by
the Kargil war, and third, the regional outspread of the BJP into traditionally “weak” areas like
the South, Bengal, Orissa, etc.. The share of pro-BJP elements in total POM space however is
not seen to increase with equal sharpness, because (see Fig. 1) the share of “distributed opinion
makers” component (where pro-BJP penetration is relatively higher) in net POM space is
simultaneously reducing, while the percentage share of pro-BJP elements in TV newspace, in
spite of rapid increase, remains quite low.
The second point of note is the sharp fall in pro-BJP share between 2002 and 2005, both in TV
newspace and newsprint. There are two reasons for it; first, the Gujarat riots enabled the anti-
BJP elements in both these components to unleash an anti-BJP blitzkrieg – which affected it
sharply in the newly-emergent support areas (see above) but not so in its traditional areas.
Second, the creation of a plethora of regional TV news channels among whom the pro-BJP
elements could not establish an influence. The increasing share of these channels reduced the
proportional share of pro-BJP elements.
The third point of note is the consequence of the above two combined with the baseline
information of fig. 1. The solid line in fig. 2 shows this: the net share of pro-BJP-ideology
elements, which was of the order of 30% at the peak of Sri Ram Janambhoomi agitation, rose
to 33% post-Kargil, had come down to about 25% in 2004 and is only 20% in 2009.
Now we are in a position to view explicitly how the POM altered the electoral outcome in the
2004 and 2009 general elections. Figure 3 shows a number line varying from -100 at left end to
+100 at right. This is the “Number Line of National Mood”. A value of -100 (left end) denotes
a value of national mood – or call it undercurrent – that is completely pro-Congress. A value of
+100 denotes completely pro-BJP. Zero denotes perfectly neutral. The two directed arrows
above the number line illustrate what happened in the 2004 and 2009 general elections. In
2004, the starting national mood (say 4 months prior to elections) was +40. But the share of
pro-BJP-ideology elements in the POM space was only 25%. The distinctly anti-BJP POM
pulled the +40 to a zero. No wonder the BJP’s chief strategists later diagnosed the result as “no
national current, only an agglomeration of local currents”. Just as two waves of equal amplitude
and frequency but exactly 180° out of phase create a zero, here a positive national mood in
favour of the BJP was fully neutralized by the POM with no resultant wave visible anywhere.
In the precise absence of a visible wave lay implicit the dialectics of the underlying processes –
the reality of what had actually taken place.
2009 was relatively explicit, as the starting position was a +20 in favour of BJP (following
defeats in Rajasthan & Delhi, and Navin Pattanaik’s treachery). Share of pro-BJP elements in
POM space had further reduced to 20%. As a result the POM pulled the national mood 50
points to the left, landing at -30. And now nobody disputed the existence of a pro-Congress
undercurrent, quite oblivious of the movements and the forces that lay hidden behind it. This
explains the unbelievable electoral angularities listed earlier in this note.
Now we come to the basic question of why the share of pro-BJP-ideology elements, call it the
RSS school of thought, remains so low among the two organized components of the POM, and
is going down steadily. There are two very profound reasons for it.
-100
Pro-Cong
+100
Pro-BJP
0
2004:
POM Impact
+40
2009:
POM Impact
+20
Fig. 3. Number line of National Mood, showing shifts in national
mood induced by POM in 2004 & 2009.
-30
The first flows from the prevailing conflict of civilizations. This, particularly in the context of
its ramifications on our Hindu civilization, is too complex a subject to be dealt with in this note.
A good explanation may be found in the article titled “Hindu Rashtra, the Conflict of
Civilizations and Le Chatelier’s Principle” which is available on the link
http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=267&pag
e=10 (This was published in the Dec 14, 2008 issue of the Organiser weekly). In a nutshell, it
is natural for contemporary civilizations to try to impose themselves on each other. Obviously,
the contemporaneously dominant civilizations will try to do so more forcefully on the weaker
ones, than the other way round. An easy means of so doing is to capture the institutionalized
Public Opinion Makers of these civilizations – which means the TV-news and Newspapers in
their POM spaces. In our context the Hindu civilization is the victim, and the Western – mostly
Anglo-American aided by a strong Church+Left content, the aggressor. As the mentioned
article explains, the coming to power of the BJP around the turn of the millennium redoubled
the drive of the aggressors to capture our POM space – and hence the gradual fall in pro-BJPideology
content in our POM since that period. The Gujarat riots simply offered them an
opportunity to launch a blitzkrieg.
But that is only part of the explanation. Why did the defenders of the Hindu civilization remain
sitting ducks in the face of this offensive? Why did the people who fought and rolled back eight
hundred years of Islamic invasion from our frontiers, and one-and-a-half centuries of insidious
European attempt to undermine our mind and character, fail to respond to the situation? One,
they simply – and unfortunately – did not even realize what game was going on around them.
And two, the most pre-eminent among the defenders of the Hindu civilization in this day &
age, namely the RSS school of thought, had been trained instinctively to work and sacrifice
without ever beating their own drums. The ideal was the foundation of a building – never to be
seen, but the bedrock on which the edifice stands. A very noble ideal, but unfortunately, this
very ingrained instinct became a weakness in facing up to the new form of invasion.
People trained in the RSS school implicitly abhorred propaganda. This naturally carried over
into the BJP. Thus while every small political party in the country – right from the “Dravidian”
ones, the Akalis, and even the born-yesterday outfit of film-hero Chiranjeevi had their own TV
channels, the BJP steadfastly avoided it. More importantly, they even avoided implanting their
agents into “neutral” news channels and papers. They had forgotten that even in the
Mahabharat, Dharmaraja Yudhisthir had to be balanced by down-to-earth Arjun & Bhim to
face up to the wicked Kauravas.
Thus it happened that on the one hand the institutionalized components of the POM kept on
expanding more and more into total POM space pushing the stable source of BJP support – the
“distributed opinion makers” – into a corner, while on the other hand the organized foreign
agencies continued to increase the width and depth of their influence within these
institutionalized components – their only challenge coming not from the defenders of
nationalism but from petty regional groups serving their own local interests. This is what is
shown in figures 1 & 2. And the unfortunate consequences are illustrated in fig. 3.
Now it is time to move from an analysis of the past into preparation for the future. Purely from
the political perspective, the RSS school of thought has to increase its share in the
institutionalized POM space. If not, its political sway and gradually its ability to influence
Bharatvarsha and the world at large (Krinvanto Vishwam Aryam?) will wither away with time.
This has to be done both at the national and regional levels. Without, the BJP might still win
assembly elections in its traditional areas of influence – because in these elections the
“distributed opinion makers” will continue to play a relatively larger role for some time to
come. However, when it comes to emerging into traditionally weak regions, as well as fighting
national elections – its contraction in the POM space will push it out of serious reckoning – in
spite of a hundred positive factors, in traditional electoral terms, working in its favour.
In its journey to occupy more of the institutionalized POM space, the RSS school of thought
has to be careful not to fall into the “purist” trap. This essentially implies preaching to the
converted – and comes very easily to ideologically committed and cadre-based families. The
RSS ideological school runs a number of publications, which serve as means of internal
communication and motivation. They cannot be considered as part of POM space because they
are not “public”. The first requirement for getting into this space is credibility of neutrality. A
good example is NDTV – which is sponsored by Church elements with some leftist overlap. It
has good credibility among middle-class Indians who do not suspect its neutrality and
appreciate its professionalism. Yet most of the anti-BJP tricks – like the Mangalore pub-attack
propaganda, Kandhamal, demonisation of Shri Varun Gandhi & Shri Narendra Modi, the 26/11
“hatred for politicians” trick and many more as mentioned before, have been spawned by this
channel.
The RSS school of thought may aim to strongly back at least one English and two Hindi
channels at national level, and at least one channel in every region (i.e. linguistic state). They
must pass the test of credibility of neutrality. Which implies that they should be seen to be
dealing overtly with Congress, leftists and others similar to the way they deal with the BJP –
and also sometimes show programmes which are not preferred by the RSS school. They should
not overstress on activities of Hindu Nationalist organizations. Otherwise they will simply end
up preaching to the converted. Further, they should be professionally excellent so that they
quickly occupy more of segment space. And a similar effort should be made in the newspaper
space. They should be able to establish themselves in their respective segments within the next
two years; else it will be too late for the next general elections.
The objective of this note is not to belittle all other causes that led to the BJP defeat. They are
certainly relevant, and the party’s analysts will be able to identify them. There are significant
differences between many of the factors leading to 2004 and 2009 electoral defeats. In 2004,
worker demotivation was a major factor. This was caused by the absence of a visible mapping
between party ideology and party’s governance. This grassroots’ demotivation was sought to be
tempered by central organization’s forcefulness, which in turn created over-centralization and
neglect of grassroots’ requirements. Even in 2009 the party has not been able to come out of the
inertia of these ill-effects. Wherever the grassroots has been re-energized (like in Jharkhand,
where Babulal Marandi’s resignation gave a shock to the centre which stopped interfering
thenceforth) the party has done well, wherever it has been steamrolled (as in Uttarakhand) the
party has done badly. Among other factors – the party’s Yuva Morcha has to be significantly
revitalized, and the RSS school of thought has to contribute to this.
Returning to the theme, there is no doubt that people trained in the pro-BJP-ideology school
will have some difficulty in getting into the suggested indirect-propaganda mode. But it is the
same sort of difficulty and dilemma that Arjuna had faced at the start of the Kurukshetra battle.
The cause of this nation, of this civilization, of humanity and of the greatest truth should be
able to neutralize softer emotions that repel against show-business – just as Arjuna had to train
his mind as well as his heart to fight against Bhishma Pitamah and Guru Dronacharya. And like
with Arjuna, here too Shri Krishna will be amongst us, leading and guiding us all the time …..
CONCLUSIONS
The gradual contraction of the influence of the RSS school of thought in the “Public Opinion
Maker” space is the fundamental reason for successive BJP defeats. The BJP and the
ideological school behind it cannot hope to attain a commanding position in national politics
and influence the evolution of our nation and thence the world without first occupying a certain
threshold position in this (itself evolving) POM space. While doing so it should be careful not
to fall into the “purist” trap, i.e. preaching only to the converted, which comes easily to
ideologically committed and cadre-based families.